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TAXCOMPLIANCE: AN INVESTIGATION USING INDIVIDUAL TCMP DATA
ABSTRACT
Inthis paper, we analyze the tax compliance behavior of (IStaxpayersby
using a 1979 data set that combines information from a random sample of
individual tax returns each of which has been thoroughly audited, IRS
administrative records, and sociodemographic data from the Census. We find
evidence that both audits and tax code provisions affect compliance. However,
the effects are significant for only the low and high income groups.
Interestingly, previous research has shown that these groups also participate
most actively in underground economic activities, the income from which is not
reported on any tax returns. Our results for audits suggest that the "ripple
or general deterrent effect of audits may be many times larger than the direct
revenue yield of audits for high income taxpayers. Our results for allowable
subtractions from income imply that the 1986 Tax Reform Act changes to lower
allowable subtractions nay have procompliance effects.
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Carolina flER Richardson, TX 75080
ChapelHill, NC27599 1050 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge.MA 02138I.Introduction
There has been substantial concern and much speculation about how the
continuing declines in audit rates affect tax compliance. In addition, with
the recent tax code revisions that eliminated or reduced some tax deductions,
there has been some question about how the allowed deductions and other types
of subtractions (e.g., adjustments, exemptions, and credits) affect taxpayers'
overall compliance strategies. In order to address these issues we estimate a
standard model of taxpayer compliance using a 1979 data set that combines
information for a random sample of individual returns and the results of
intensive audits of those returns, Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
administrative records, and soclodemographic data from the Census.
Although the theoretical models of taxpayer compliance are well-
developed, restrictions on access to the data have limited the empirical work.
Previously available data sets either lack information on audit rates and IRS
administration or have lintited measures of true Income. None of the data sets
have information on subtraction items. Further, all of the data sets are
twenty years old.
To sunuiiarize our most interesting empirical results, we find that audits
stimulate compliance for all taxpayer groups considered. However, audits have
a significant effect on the compliance behavior of only the highest income
groups, taxpayers with income over $50,000. As In previous studies, we find
that the compliance effects of audits are relatively small. Specificafly, we
find that a 10 percent increase in audits would lead to only a i.4 percent
Increase in reported income for our high income group. However, the implied
increase in revenue as a result of a Ia percent increase in audits is
substantial, $1.5 billion. This amount greatly exceeds the direct revenue2
effect of audits for the high income group. Our results imply that the
indirect, "ripple" or general deterrent effect (as it is variously called) of
audits yields $150 for every $1 of direct revenue yield.In the last ten
years the audit rates of all nonbusiness income groups havefallen from 2.11
percent to 1.03 percent and the drop in the audit rate of the high income
group has been even larger. Such declines in audit rates appearto have
significant indirect revenue costs.
As regards the effect of the tax code on compliance, we find that
taxpayers who have higher legal adjustments, deductions, exemptions,and
credits to subtract from income in computing their tax obligations reportless
income, other things including income being equal. At first this result may
seem surprising.It occurs though because higher allowable subtractions
(i.e., adjustments, deductions, exemptions, and credits) lower a taxpayer's
audit costs and hence make underreporting Income more attractive. The effect
is significant for our lowest and highest income groups. The elasticities
implied by our results are -.13 for the lowest income group and-.26 for our
highest income group. Our results for allowable subtractions suggestthat
decreases in allowed subtractions such as those incorporated in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 may not only increase revenue directly, but may also increaseit
indirectly by raising the expected cost of an audit and hence theamount of
income reported.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present
the theoretical model.In Sections III and IV we describe the data and the
empirical model. The section on the empirical model also includes abrief
discussion of related work. Sections V and VI contain the results and
conclusions respectively.3
TI. Conceptual Framework
In the now standard model of individual tax compliance, a taxpayer
chooses the amount of incoiiie, and possibly other items, to report to the tax
collection agency in order to maximize expected utility given the tax and
penalty structure and given the taxpayer's understanding of how returns are
selected for audit (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). The uncertainty arises
because the taxpayers believe there is a nonzero audit probabflity, possibly
dependent on the income and other items reported to the tax agency. In the
first part of this section we present a basic model of tax compliance and then
at the end of the section explain how the model can be extended to consider
time allocation and tax avoidance decisions.
In the basic model we assume that an individual taxpayer chooses the
amount of reported income and subtractions to maximize expected utility. We
consider the income and subtraction reporting decisions separately since a
taxpayer's opportunities for noncompliance are different for the two types of
reports and since empirical evidence shows that the compliance rates are
markedly different for the two types of reports (Roth, Scholz, and Witte,
1989).
We assume that a taxpayer's utility in each state (i.e.. audited or not
audited) depends on the individual's consumption expenditure. One
complication of introducing subtractions to the model is that subtractions
under the tax code include (I) expenses such as casualty losses from which the
taxpayer derives no utility and (2) expenses such as business entertainment
from which the taxpayer derives utility. Taxpayers with higher allowed
subtractions of either type have lower tax obligations than do other taxpayer,4
ceteris paribus. Taxpayers with higher casualty losses also have less to
spend on goods and services from which they derive utility.
We assume that a fraction $ of an individual's allowed subtractions are
for expenses such as casualty losses that yield no utility. The individual's
consumption of goods and services if not audited is
—I-t(!r - sr) - $S
where I and 1r are the Individual's income and reported income respectively, S
and S' are the Individual's subtractions allowed by the tax code and reported
respectively, and t is the tax rate. An individual's consumption when not
audited are the after-tax income minus expenditures on the subtractions items
for which the individual receives no utility. If all of the subtractions are
for consumption expenditures from which the individual derives utility (i.e.,
8—0), then the individual's consumption is the after-tax income, as In the
standard model with only income reporting.






where f is the penalty rate. The taxpayer's consumption in this case is the
income after taxes and penalties minus subtractions items for which the
individual receives no utility.
A taxpayer chooses reported income and subtractions to maximize expected
utility which is5
(I -p(r,si) U(C''+pcIr,sr)) U(C')
whereP is the audit probability function. Consistent with the way in which
the IRS s&ects returns for audit, we represent a taxpayer's reports as
affecting the probability of an audit.' The probability of an audit might
also depend on other factors such as the amount of income from IRS information
reports.
We assume that the audit probability function decreases at a decreasing
rate with reported income and increases at an increasing rate with reported
subtractions. We do not make any assumptions on the sign of the cross partial
of the audit probability function with respect to reported income and
subtractions but do assume that the magnitude of the cross partial effect is
smaller than the own second partial effects. The assumption that the effects
of reported income and subtractions are opposite in sign is required in order
to have an internal optimum. Whether the effects must be of the assumed signs
for an internal optimum depend on the relative values of (1-P) and Pf. In
1979 the fraction of returns audited was only .0211, and fine rates, even on
returns subject to civil penalties, were less than unreported tax obligations
(i.e., f c 1). Thus, for almost all (and perhaps all) taxpayers, (1-P) >Pf
in which case the probability of an audit must be decreasing in reported
income and increasing in reported subtractions at an internal optimum. Unless
the cross partial effects are very large in magnitude, an internal optimum
also requires at least one of the second derivative assumptions Made above,
namely P11 >0and P22 >0.6
As in the model with only reported income, the effect of increased
income on a taxpayer's reported income (and reported subtractions) depends on
the extent of risk aversion. Similarly, the effect of an increase in
subtractions depends on the extent of risk aversion. Ohe effect ofincreased
subtractions is to lower the "true" tax obligation and the cost of being
audited. With lower audit costs, reported income falls and reported
subtractions increase. Indeed, with $= 0or with risk neutrality, an
increase in subtractions has only an audit cost effect. However, unless
• 0, increased subtractions also reduce consumption from whichthe
individual derives utility. This second effect of increased subtractionsis a
wealth type effect. As in the usual tax compliance models, the directionof
this effect depends on the individual's preferences. For instance,with a
quadratic constant relative risk aversion utility function,the wealth effect
of increased subtractions unambiguously increases reported income. However,
with other utility functions, even nonquadratic constant relative risk
aversion functions, the direction of the wealth effect on reported income
depends on the particular parameters of the utility function.
This model can be extended straightforwardly to include an individual's
time allocation (Andersen, 1977; Pencavel, 1919) or tax avoidance decisions
(Cross and Shaw, 1982). In the time allocation model an individualsutility
depends on both consumption and leisure. The individual's incomeis now
endogenous and the individual chooses the number of hours to workand the
amount of income and subtractions to report to the tax agency given the wage
and any nonlabor income.
In the tax avoidance model, the individual can make decisions that
affect the amount of income that is taxable and the amount of allowedI
subtractions. Tax avoidance models are intended to reflect a taxpayer's
opportunities to transform income into a foriTi that is untaxed ortaxed at a
lower rate than other types of income and the opportunities to deduct
expenditures for consumption items in computing taxable Income.Transforming
income from a taxable form to a nontaxable (or only partially taxable)form
has costs and the costs are generally assumed to increase at an increasing
rate with the amount of income or expenditures that become nontaxable.These
costs might include transaction, financial liquidity, or information costs.
We could extend our model to incorporate the idea of tax avoidance by
aflowing the individual to choose the 1evel of legally allowablesubtractions
but assuming that there is a cost to obtaining the subtractions andthat the
cost increases at an increasing rate with the amount of the subtractions.The
taxpayer then makes the tax compliance and tax avoidancedecisions jointly.
III.Data
Our data set combines 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
(TCMP) data for individual returns with IRS administrative recordsfor
District Offices and 1980 Census data at the five-digit Zip Codelevel.2
Kerging other data bases with the TCMP data is necessary inorder to estimate
meaningful compliance models because TCMP data contains onlyinformation
available from the tax return and the auditor's findings. While theTCMP data
includes much of the required information on taxpayer income andtransactions
it contains very limited data on sociodemographic charaCteriStc5
and no
administrative or audit data.8
Previously, academic researchers have had to work with aggregate data in
order to merge administrative and audit information with the TCMP data. fly
working with IRS personnel in the Research Division, we were able to use the
individual TCMP data and to merge these data with other data. Our access to
the TCMP data was understandably limited and ronitored. We were able to use
the data for about six months (June-November, 1988) and we submitted the
programs and received the output through IRS employees.
The IRS separates the TCMP and audit data into twelve separate audit
groups based on the income level, the complexity of the tax return, and on the
portion of the income from unincorporated business earnings. Previous work by
the IRS and others (Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Dubin and Wilde, 1988) shows
that compliance behavior varies substantially across taxpayer groups.
Further, theIRSdevelops separate audit selection formulas for each of the
twelve groups. For these reasons we analyze the audit classes separately.
The model developed in the previous section is most appropriate for
taxpayers who directly and consciously choose their reported subtractions and
who use their subtractions to alter their tax liability in the manner
described in the previous section. This Is not likely to be the case for
taxpayers claiming standard deductions or for taxpayers with substantial
unincorporated business income (i.e., Income on Schedules C or F).
Comparisons of the returns for nonbusiness and business classes with
comparable incomes suggest that there may be substantial mixing of some
subtractions and unincorporated business expenses. Fewer business group
taxpayers itemize than do those with similar incomes in nonbusiness groups.
Of those who itemize, the business groups claim larger average deductions for
state and local taxes and for health expenditures, both of which might be9
difficult or disadvantageous to nix with business expenses, than do the
nonbusiness classes of similar incomes. However, the business groups claim
less on average for iortgage expenses and real estate tax deductions1 where it
might be possible to mix business and nonbusiness expenses. A joint model of
their business activities and tax compliance together with longer access to
the TCI4P data would be required to understand the income reporting behavior
for business returns.
We estimate our model for the four audit classes that itemize deductions
and that have income primarily from sources other than unincorporated
businesses. The four groups differ by their total positive income (i.e.. sum
of all income items with positive entries). Table I contains the definitions
of the audit classes.
IV. Empirical Model
Based on our theoretical work, we specify a taxpayer's reported income
and subtractions as depending on true income, the legally allowable
subtractions from income, the tax and penalty structure, tastes and
preferences, and the probability of an audit (endogenous).3 We chose audits
as the measure of endorsement policy since this is the enforcement action that
has been of most interest in the literature on tax compliance and since the
IRS believes that audits are its most effective instrument for stimulating
accurate taxpayer reports (Comptroller General of the United states, 1976, p.
i). Given the limited time for which we had access to the data and the
restrictions imposed by the IRS, we estimated only the income reporting
equation. We chose to estimate the equation for reported income ratherthan10
for reported subtractions because most noncompliance takes the from of
underreported income rather than overreported subtractions. In 1987, the IRS
estimates that 87 percent of the "tax gap" on filed individual returns
resulted from underreports of income (IRS, 1988a).
We were not allowed to estimate an audit equation because of IRS fears
regarding revelation of its audit selection rules. We account for the fact
that the probability of audit is endogenous by estimating the income reporting
equation using two stage least squares. Two stage least squares allows for
the endogeneity of audits without estimating the audit equation. In this
application two-stage least squares may even have some advantage over systems
estimation since our information about the form of the audit equation is
necessarily limited and two stage least squares does not spread omitted
variable bias across equations.
We identify the income reporting equation by excluding from the income
reporting equation two tRS variables that affect the probability of audit but
do not directly affect reporting behavior. These variables are a measure of
crowding at the IRS District Office level and of' IRS work load. We measure
these variables at the District Office level because most direct IRS contacts,
including audits, are carried out by District Office employees. In 1969 there
were 58 IRS districts. The boundaries of the districts were coterminous with
states in all but the six most populous states (IRS, 1980).
Our measure of crowding reflects restrictions on the IRSs ability tQ
allocate its resources across districts as it would like. Understanding the
crowding measure requires some explanation of how the IRS selects most tax
returns for audit. for most audited returns, the first step in the selection
process is the scoring of all filed returns for audit potential using formulas11
developed using TCMP data from three or more years ago. The formulas,
referred to as DII formulas, are based on discriminant analysis designed to
differentiate those returns that show large discrepancies (positive or
negative) between the taxpayers' reports and the auditors' findings versus
those returns that show little or no discrepancy. The DIF formulas assign a
numerical value to each return with higher scored returns having higher audit
priority. The DIF formulas are done separately for each audit class. The IRS
establishes a national DIF cut-off score for each audit class and would like
to audit all returns with OIF scores above this national cut-off.
Because of the distribution of its employees across Districts, the IRS
cannot carry out such an audit plan. The General Accounting Office and the
IRS found that sore districts audit returns with relatively low DIE scores
while other districts are unable to audit returns with higher scores. As a
result, some taxpayers are audited or not audited because they file in
districts that are over- or under-staffed in relation to other districts
(Comptroller General, 1976 and 1979; Wilt, 1986). The imbalance In staffing
results from civil service regulations requiring uniform pay throughout the
United States,' IRS's policy of no forced transfers, and differential impact
across districts of IRS special programs (e.g., the drug program, taxshelter
program) on resources for regular OF-score initiated audits. In order to,
correct the imbalance in staffing and carry out its desired audit plan theIRS
would have needed to transfer employees between districts and hire employees
in the under-staffed districts where it had vacancies. However, after
examining these options in the late 1970s, the General AccountingOffice
concluded that "imbalances will never be completely eliminated unless IRS12
starts moving personnel from district to district as needs dictate. In our
opinion, moving significant number of staff around the country is too
expensive in terms of money and staff morale to be considered a viable
alternative to stafPing imbalances" (Comptroller General, 1919, p. 25).
Some of the confusion about whether the probability of an audit differs
across taxpayers is a result of equating the OW scoring with the probability
of an audit. The UhF scoring is done at the national level and is uniform
across IRS districts. This does not mean though that the probabilityof an
audit, conditional on a taxpayer's report, is the same in all districts.The
lowest DIF scores audited and the probability of an audit differ markedly
across districts although the DIE scoring does not. The systematicdifference
in the probability of an audit across taxpayers Is of course essential for
being able to determine the effect of audits on compliance.
For each IRS district, our crowding variable is the sum across all
twelve audit classes of the number of returns that would have been audited in
that district if the IRS had been able to distribute the available resources
across districts in order to audit all returns with a score above the
nationally set cut-off divided by the total number of returns audited.
Districts for which the crowding variable Is below (above) one are those where
the lowest DIF scores audited in most of the audit classes are below (above)
the national cut-offs for the corresponding audit class. Our work load
measure is the number of returns filed in the district divided by thenumber
of full-tine equivalent employees in the district.
In order to use the IRS crowding and workload measures to identify the
Income reporting equation, these variables should not affect a taxpayer's
reporting decisions, apart from the effect on the probability of an audit,and13
should not be correlated with the error term in the incomereportingequation.
The first of these requirements follows directly from the standard theoretical
models of taxpayer compliance, including ours. In these models the only
effect of the administrative resources or audit selection process is through
the audit probability function. The second requirement follows from thework
of the GAO and academic researchers on the allocation of IRS resources.If
the error term in the income reporting equation is independentlydistributed
across taxpayers, then neither the work load nor the crowdingvariable are
correlated with the error term. If, however, there are regional differences
in tax compliance apart from those that are explained by the soiodemographic
and income variables in our model, then we might be concerned that thework
load variable was correlated with the error term. this might be the caseif
the IRS were able to allocate its audit resources across districts in
accordance with a consistent policy that allowed it to audit all returnswith
DIF scores above the nationally set level for that audit class. The sources
cited above though show clear evidence that the resources are notdistributed
in this way. Further, on the basis of data from 1967 to 1980, Long (1985)
concludes that the "introduction of TCMP compliance data did not bringabout
any dramatic restructuring in audit coverage--evenwhen it disclosed regions
or return classes with much lower compliance levels which werereceiving less
attention than mord compliant groupC (p. 29).
We obtain the data on reported income and true income andsubtractions
from the indIvidual, 1979 TCMP and the 1980 Census. For the measureof "true"
subtractions we use the auditor's finding on subtraction items fromthe TCMP.
The IRS believes that the TCMP examiners' estimates of subtractions are
accurate since the examiners are to request documentation for eachsubtractionI8
Our results suggest that raising the audit rate for high Income wage and
salary workers by one percentage point frofil the 1979 level of 10.4 percent to
11.4 percent would have increased average reported Income for this group by
approximately $2200 per return or 1.8 percent. The elasticity of reported
income with respect to the probability of an audit is thus .19 In 1979 the
marginal tax rate for the typical return in this audit class was 54 percent.
This implies an Increase iii tax revenue of approxImately 51148 million which
Is almost three times the direct revenue yield from audits of this group.'°
These results offer some support for the IRS claimed "ripple" effect of
audits. The IRS does not distribute Its resources across audit classes solely
on the basis of revenue yield. It devotes some audit resources to audit
classes for which the direct revenue yield is relatively low because of its
belief that audit coverage is one of the most significant factors in promoting
voluntary compliance. Our results suggest that at least for some audit
classes the declines in audit rates over the last twenty years may be partly
responsible for the decline in voluntary compliance. The decline in audit
rates may have had substantial hidden tax revenue costs.
Given our data, we examine tax compliance separately from time
allocation or tax avoidance decisions. As mentioned previously, the
theoretical models of tax compliance can be extended in a standard way to
include timeallocationor tax avoidance decisions. The data for estimating
such models are not available.In some cases though we can determine the
direction of the potential bias that might result from considering the tax
evasion decision separately.Is
the average of the young and old group ages. As an additional age variable,
we use a binary for whether at least one of the individuals filing the return
was allowed an over 65 tax exemption. The female-headed household variable is
zero if the return is a joint return and is the fraction of women householders
in single-parent families and non-family households If the return is not
joint.
Being able to merge the Census and IRS administrative and audit data
with the 1979 1GW data meant that we were able to obtain measures for the
variables required to estimate a standard model of individual taxpayer
compliance and in particular to examine the deterrent effects of audits. As
mentioned in the introduction, very little data has been available for
estimation of such models. For understandable reasons, the Individual TCHP
data are not public. None of the data previously used has intonation on
taxpayer's reported subtractions or on true subtractions. In addition, the
data sets that contain information on audit rates and IRS enforcement do not
have the auditors' estimates of Income.
Previous econometric studies of the individual model of tax compliance
use individual and aggregate data from 1969.' In the only study based on TCMP
data,7 Clotfelter (1983) uses individual TCMP data to estimate the auditors'
finding on unreported income, which in our notation is I-I', as dependent on
factors including the auditors' finding on income, the marginal tax rate on
that income,2 characteristics of the return such as the percentage of wage and
salary income, age variables, and five regional dumies. The data did not
include inforwation on audits or other IRS administrative activities.
Clotfelter assumes that all nonbusiness taxpayers face the same audit16
probabilities, ceteris paribus, examines in detail other factors related to
compliance.
Witte and Woodbury (1985) and Dubin and Wilde (1988) use data aggregated
to the three-digit ZIP Code level in order to examine the detenninants of all
estimate of voluntary compliance. V/(Tr + fl,where1' is the reported tax
obligation and r is the an estirate of the absolute value of the error that
would be accessed by a tax examiner. (If all errors were underreports. then
r would be unreported tax obligations and this would be a standard compliance
measure.) The estimates of voluntary compliance are for a sample of unaudited
returns for which the IRS can, of course, observe the reported tax obligations
but not the error in reported tax obligations. Estimates of the absolute
value of the error were obtained as follows. First, the IRS went back to the
1966 TCMP sample from which the DIF formulas were developed. The IRS used the
Off scores of the returns in the 1966 TOW sample and then estimated the
relationship between the elf scores and the absolute value of the tax error
(the difference between what the taxpayer had reported and what the TOW
auditor had found). For each audit class they regressed the absolute value of
the tax errors on the OW score. For example, for the low income,
nonbusiness, itemized returns9 they found that
r •49.4077759+.2348477DIE-score +.0002691(DLF-score)2
Second, the IRS used this estimated relationship in order to predict the
absolute value of the error in reported tax obligations for DIE-scored, but
unaudited returns. Since all returns on the IRS Master File of individual tax
returns are DIE-scored, they could estimate the voluntary compliance rates for
unaudited returns.II
Both studies based on these 1969 tax compliance estimates consider the
estimated voluntary compliance rite as dependent on sociodemographic factors
and audit probabilities. Witte and Woodbury also include measures of IRS
administrative and educational activities other than audits and Census income
as a measure of true income. To examine the effects of audits on compliance,
bUtte and Woodbury included lagged audit rates. As in this paper, Dubin and
Wilde used an instrumental variables approach in order to avoid the
simultaneity bias of including the actual audit rates. They identified the
compliance equation by using IRS expenditures at the district level. The
sociodemographic variables in both studies are fromthe1970 Census.
Beron, Tauchen, and bUtte (1988) use a model similar to the one in this
paper in order to estimate equations for reported Income and reported tax
obligations as dependent on Census income, sociodegographic variables, and
audits. They also use 1969 data aggregated to the three digit ZIP code level.
V. Results
Table 2 contains the results of estimating the income reporting
equations by two stage least squares for four audit groups. We find that
audits stimulate higher income reports for all four groups but that the effect
is statistically significant for only the highest income group. These results
are similar to previous results based on 1969 data in that audits generally
increase compliance but not necessarily significantly. Part of the reason for
the somewhat weak deterrence results in this and other work may be related to
the extent of aggregation of the audit coverage data. ror this paper we were
able to obtain the audit data only at the IRS district level.19
Asin previous theoretical work on the joint tax avoidance, time
allocation, and tax evasion decisions, we assume that the utility function is
separable in income and leisure and that preferences exhibit decreasing
absolute risk aversion. We also assume that in the population distribution
there is no correlation among the explanatory variables. For the time
allocation decision, the potential bias in the estimated effect of audits on
reported income results because our explanatory variables includetaxable
income which might be affected by the wage rate (through the choiceof the
number of hours worked) and the probability of an audit.In a linear model
the resulting bias from just this source has the same sign as the term
-dH/dpdH/dw dlr/dw
where H denotes the hours worked. p denotes the log adds of an audit,and w
denotes the wage rate.
The potential bias solely from this source may be small or nonexistent
for some groups. There is considerable evidence that wage rates have very
little, if any, effect on the hours worked by prime age malesand unmarried
women without dependents. In addition, the effects of wages onhours worked
by married women appears to be smaller than once thought.Since prime age
males and married couples have higher incomes than others, we would expectour
higher income audit classes to be comprised disproportionatelyof prime age
men and married couples and would expect little bias forthese groups.
For other groups the direction of the potential bias depends on
how
wages affect reported income and how the probabilityof audit affects hours
worked. As in the usual time allocation model without tax compliance,
the
substitution effect of an increase In the wage rate is to increasethe hours20
worked. Also, the substitution effect of an increase in the wage rate is to
increase reported income. Assuming that the substitution effect docinates so
that hours worked increase with the wage rate, then the direction of the bias
depends just on dFI/dp.If hours of work increase with the probability of an
audit, then the bias is negative and our estimated coefficient on the
probability of an audit understates the total effect allowing for how audit
coverage affects hours of work. Sufficient conditions that the hoursof work
increase with the probability of an audit are that the relative risk aversion
be increasing and greater than one (Andersen, 1977).
For the tax avoidance decision, the potential bias in the c3timated
effect of audits on reported income arises because our explanatory variables
include subtractions and taxable income. Taxpayers could affect the amount of
their subtractions and taxable income through their tax avoidance decisions.
If so, both the subtractions and the taxable Income might be affected by the
costs of tax avoidance and by the probability of an audit. The separate
biases from including subtractions and taxable income given that either might
be affected by the cost of tax avoidance have the same signs as
-dS/dpdS/dc dir/dcand di/dp di/dc dir/dc
respectively where c is a parameter that reflects the cost of transferring
expenditures into a tax deductible item or the cost of transforming income
into a nontaxable form. An increase in the cost of tax avoidance (c) would
decrease subtractions (S) and increase taxable income (1).If, as is often
claimed, tax avoidance and evasion are substitutes, then an increase in the
cost of avoidance would result in more evasion which would decrease reported
income. Also, an increase in the probability of an audit would cause more tax
avoidance which would increase subtractions and lower the amount of income21
that is taxable, ceteris paribus. Both of the above terms are therefore
negative which means that, if anything, our estimated coefficients onthe
probability of an audit understate the effects of audits on reported income.
As do Witte and Woodbury (1985). we find that reported income increases
with true income, as measured by the auditors' findings and by Census income
but generally at a decreasing or linear rate." Auditors' estimates of true
income are for the specific tax return and are far more strongly related to
reporting behavior than is Census income although the Census incomevariables
are jointly significant for two of the four audit classes.
We also find that taxpayers with higher allowable subtractions. ceteris
paribus, report lass income. This effect is significant for the highestand
lowest income groups described in Table 1. These two are also the least
compliant of our four groups. The lowest and highest income groupsfail to
report 7 and 4 percent of their incomes respectively whereasthe two middle
income groups fail to report 3 and 2 percent of their incomes respectively.
Recall that the effect of subtractions on reported income depends onthe
relative magnitudes of an audit cost and wealth effects. The auditcost
effect decreases reported income whereas the wealth effect may increase
reported income. We find that, if subtractions have any effect onreported
income, then the negative audit cost effect dominates any positivewealth
effect.
The finding that the allowed subtractions affect reported income
supports the strategic audit lottery models such as ours,Simple ad hoc rult
in which taxpayers underreport some fraction of their Incomes oromit the
income not subject to information results would not produce theresult that22
allowed subtractions affect reported income. Also, ad hoc rules under which
taxpayers try to avoid audits by keeping the ratio of their reported
subtractions to reported income within some rumored bounds should not produce
these findings.
Our results regarding subtractions may give soie Indication of the
effect of tax reform and simplification on compliance. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 curtailed allowable subtractions. We find that, if anything, a reduction
in allowable subtractions should increase reported income holding other
factors including "true" taxable income constant. Limitations on allowable
subtractions were justified on the basis of increasing the pcrceived fairness
of the tax system and, thus, encouraging compliance. Our results suggest that
taxpayers' strategic playing of the audit lottery might also lead to greater
compliance as subtractions are reduced.
In comparison with previous research based on 1969 IRS data, we find
less pronounced sociodemographic effects. Our results provide no evidence
that education, race, joint filing status, or gender affect compliance.
Results for other sociodemographics are mixed. The coefficients on the age
variables are significant only for one taxpayer group, namely taxpayers with
total positive income between $25,000 and $50,000. Eor this group, we find
the usual procompliance effect of being older. However, with average age held
constant, the over 65 variable is associated with lower not higher levels of
compliance.'2 Although there is a cormiion perception that older taxpayers are
more compliant than younger taxpayers, other researchers including those doing
survey and experimental studies have sometimes found weak or negative effects
of audits on compliance (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). We also find that the23
fraction of the population unemployed has a significant and positive effect on
compliance for the two lower income groups. This result is perhaps surprising
but has also appearedin compl lance work with 1969 data (8eron,et al., 1988).
Possibly,theunesployment effect is attributable to workers who were
unemployedfor only part of the year filing simple tax returns to get a refund
fromthe withholding during the part of the year when they worked. In order
to obtain the refund the workers must report the income received when working.
Part of the reason that previous studies may have found stronger
sociodemographiceffects is that they had no direct measures of allowable
subtractions. The sociodemographic variables in these sttitiin may proxy for
theomitted subtraction variables such as the exclusion of Social Security
Income and the additional exemption for those over 65 years old.
VI. Conclusions
The IRS believes that audits have both direct and indirect revenue
effects and allocates its audit resources accordingly. The direct revenue
effects are from the penalties and additional taxes assessed on audited
returns. The indirect effects arise from the potential specific and general
deterrent effects of audits. Specific deterrence occurs if taxpayers who are
audited become niore compliant. General deterrence occurs if audits promote
compliance by other taxpayers.
The work reported in this paper relates to the general deterrenteffect
(in IRS terminology the ripple effect) of audits. We finddeterrent effects
for all four groups considered but the effects are significant onlyfor the
high Income, nonbusiness group. Direct revenue yields of audits are
also
larger for this group than for any other group of taxpayers.In 1979, the24
year from which we obtain our data, 28 percent of the additional tax and
penalty assessments from audits were from this group although it comprised
only 1.1 percent of all individual tax returns filed. By 1988, the most
recent year for which the data is available, the high income, nonbusiness
group had grown to 9.8 percent of all individual returns and had 49 percent of
the additional tax and penalty assessments.
The IRS allocates audit resources to some low and middle income groups.
particularly groups that file relatively simple returns, even though it knows
that the direct revenue yield Is low and less than could be obtained from
other groups. The IRS rationale for this policy is the assumption that there
are trade-offs between direct revenue and general deterrence in the allocation
of audit resources. The IRS wants to maintain an audit presence in each
audit group in order generate general deterrence effects. Our results caution
against this approach. Reallocating audit resources to the high income,
nonbusiness group may increase direct revenue yield and generate additional
general deterrent effects.
Before reconrending such a policy several additional issues need to be
examined thoroughly. First, the results we obtain here need to be replicated.
In doing so, it would be useful if less aggregated audit coverage data were
available. Second, weneedto know more about the specific deterrent effects
of audits. The work that has been done does not provide much evidence about
the magnitude of the specific deterrent effect or even necessarily if it
exists (Roth, et al., pp 93-96). If specific deterrent effects are high for
some income groups, then allocating audit resources to them might be justified
even if the direct revenue and general deterrent effects were quite small.25
Finally, we need to know how the general deterrent threat of audits is
transmitted. The existing literature suggests that taxpayers form their
perceptions of the probability of being audited mainly from their own
experiences, from friends and associates, and from tax professionals. It is
not clear though whether taxpayers necessarily make a clear distinction
between audits and other IRS contacts. Indeed, taxpayers may equate any IRS
contact regarding a tax return as equivalent to an audit. In recent years,
substantially more contacts with the IRS have resulted from IRS activities
other than formal tax return audits. Most IRS contacts come as a result of
computerized checking of returns and matching of returns against other
information documents.Forexample, in 1988, 18 million returns were
corrected through correspondence with Service Centers while only while only 1
million returns were audited. It may be that Service Center contacts can
serve, by and large, to establish IRS presence for low and middle income
groups that file simple returns and that at least some audit resources can be
reallocated to higher income groups. In this way the IRS might be able to
reverse the marked declines in audit rates for high income taxpayers including
the non-business, high incoffie taxpayers for whom the audit rate fell from
10.55 percent in 1979 to 2.32 percent in 1988.
Ouring the debates about the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was much
discussion of the perceptual benefits of reducing allowable subtractions from
income (I.e., itemized deduction, credits and adjustments). It was thought
that such reductions would increase the perceived fairness of the tax code
and, thus, indirectly promote compliance. There was little discussion of the
potential direct benefits of such reforms. Indeed, at the time of the
debates, there was, as far as we are aware, no work that examined the direct26
effect of such tax code provisions. As shown in Section II, theory provides
no unambiguous predictions regrading these direct effects. However, our
eiiipirical work provides quite strong support for direct procoapliancebenefits
flowing from such tax code changes. These procomplianceeffects are
significant for our highest and lowest income groups.
Our findings regarding subtractions are consistent withadditional
information. As reported above, the direct revenue yield of audits is highest
for the highest income group. The direct revenue yield is also surprisingly
high for our lowest income group. For example, in 1988, Revenue Agents,On
average,obtainS $5,778 in taxes and penalties for audits of our lowest
income group. Considering that individuals in the group had relatively
complex returns but income below $10,000, it appears that theaudit lottery is
a game of choice for this group. The underground economy literaturealso
suggests that high and some low income groups are least compliantwith tax
laws. See Simon and Witte (1982) and Roth, Scholz and Wltte (1989) for
surveys. As noted previously, these two groups are also theleast compliant
of the groups we consider.
From a policy perspective, the magnitude of the effect of changes in
legal subtractions on compliance is also of interest. As for audits,the
effects of legal subtractions on reported income are moderate. For our lowest
income group the elasticity of income report with respect to a change in legal
subtractions is only -.13. For our highest income group, this elasticity is
twice as large, -.26. but still quite modest. Clearly, there are limits to
the additional compliance that can be obtained from simplification of the tax
code.27
Our resa1ts and other flterature suggest that both audits and tax code
provisions can affect the compliance behavior of taxpayers. However, the
magnitude of the effects of such pvern.entp1 changes is limited. The
Implication is that nongovernmental (e.g., changes in attitudes, transactions,
etc.) play a large role in compliance.28
Footnotes
'Although the audit selection rules ire not publicly released, the IRS
provides information on how it develops the rules. See Comptroller General of
the United States (1976), Weddick (1982) and Iliniker (1987) for discussions of
how the discriminant formulas are developed and WUt (1986) for a discussion
of the trends in audit selection using this method.
2The TCMP data is a stratified random sample of individual tax returns
each of which has been audited line-by-line by experienced IRS examiners. For
a more complete description of the data and its limitations see Roth, Scholz.
and Witte (1989, p. 65-69) and IRS (19Mb, A 3-7).
3See also Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1988). Note that If a taxpayer's
reports affect the probability of an audit, then It is the parameters of the
audit probability function rather than just the probability of an audit that
affects taxpayer compliance. With our approach we are examining the effect of
a parallel shift in the log odds of an audit when evaluated at the optimum
reported income and reported subtractions for a taxpayer who makes his or her
reporting decisions to maximize expected utility. See Tauchen and Witte
(1986) for further details.
4Because of difficulty in hiring and retaining auditors in high-wage
Districts such as Manhattan, the IRS has recently been granted an exemption
from the uniform pay scale requirements.
51f taxpayers are risk neutral, then only a taxpayer's estimates of the
income that the tax auditors could find affects compliance. An assumption of
risk neutrality night justify using only the auditor's finding of income as
the measure of true income.2g
'For comprehensive surveys of the literature on tax compliance see Witte
and Woodbury (1983). Kinsey (1986), Jackson and Milliron (1986), Tauchen and
Witte (1986), Mierican Bar Foundation (1988), Roth. Scholz, and Witte (1989).
'Klepper and Nagin (1988) do not directly estImate a model of individual
tax compliance but have devised a way to use 1982 ICIIP data aggregated to the
national level for each audit class In order to examine the relationship among
the line item voluntary compliance ratios for about 30 separate line items.
8Clotfelter Includes a marglna tax rate variable for the coitibined
federal and state rates. Even when using both state and federal taxes, we
were not able to obtain sufficient independent variation In the marginal tax
rates and income in order to identify separate tax and incatile effects. Our
results thus show how reported income varies with true incOne and the
accompanying change in taxes due.
9The IRS experimented with functional forms and for other audit classes
used semi-logarithmic functions.
'°The tax increase estimate might be an overstatement since some
subtractions including the deduction for sales tax would Increase with higher
reported income. However, the medical deductions would fall since for 1919
taxpayers could deduct medicine and drugs only in excess of one percent of
income net of expenses and other medical expenses only in excess of threeS
percent of income net of adjustments.
ItFor audit class six, the findings are consistent with a linear income
effect in that the coefficient on the squared income term is positive but
insignificant. in addition, the coefficient is very small in magnitude. The30
derivative of reported income with respect to theauditor's assessment of
income is 1.0004 times larger with than without the squaredterm.
The sociodemographic variables might also be a partial measure of the
fraction of the subtractions that are for items that doand do not provide
utility. Relatively more of the subtractions forolder individuals might be
for medical expenditures which reduce the available fundsfor expenditure on
other goods and services. The reduction funds for these expendituresmight
affect compliance decisions.3!
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Table I:Definition of Non-business Audit Classes
Audit Class Acrony. Definition
Low Income-Complex il-C Non-business return'; Total Positive
Income2 under $10,000;
At least one of following:
(I) itemized deductions
(2) interest or dividend income
above $400




(4) credits other than political
donations and earned income
(5) Schedule C or F
(6) excess FICA
(7) taxes other than from tax
tables
Middle Income I Mu-C Non-business return; Total Positive
-Complex Income of at least $10,000 and
less than $25,000;
At least one of the following:
(1) itemized deductions
(2) income or losses from
partnerships. estates or
trusts, or small business
corporat ions
(3) schedule C or F
Middle Income 2 1412 Non-business return; Total
Positive Income is at least
$25,000 and less than $50,000
High Income HI Non-business return; Total
Positive Income greater than
$50,000
'A non-business return Is defined as a return that does not meet the
conditions for a business return. A business return is a return thatmeets
one of the following conditions:
(1)Total gross receipts from Schedule C and F are at least $100,000
(2)Total gross receipts are at least $25,000 and less than$100,000;
Total positive income2 from sources other than Schedule Cand F
is less than $50,000
(3)Total gross receipts are less than $25,000; Total PositiveIncome
from sources other than Schedule C and F is less than TotalGross
Receipts
2Total Positive Income is the sum of the positive incomeitems.34
Table 2:Empirical Results for Reported Income
(t-values in Parentheses)
Audit Class
Variable LI-ID Mu-ID P112 141
Log Odds of an audit -- 71.16 26.05 55.05 16916.81*
endogenous (0.33) (0.10) (0.20) (1.86)
True Income
Auditor's Assessment 0.72** 1.30** 1.17 7.02
(72.60) (74.65) (32.74) (97.64)
Auditor's Assessment _0.67** -1.19 .4.17** 2.28
Squared (in (-24.23) (-32.90) (-15.57) (1.01)
$1,000,000,000)
CensusIncome 0.65 0.47 0.24 5.46
(0.78) (0.43) (0.27) (0.35)
Census Income Squared .7.44 -1.07 -0.31 -7.23
(in $100,000) (.0.99) (-0.33) (-0.24) (-0.32)
Tax Code Variables
Subtraction per Exam _0.14** -0.02 -0.02 1.02**
(-5.52) (-1.24) (-1.52) (-28.40)
Fraction over 65 130.88 -199.18 -1327.02 15579.51
(0.65) (-0.46) (-2.11) (1.60)
Fraction Unemployed 3119.86' 2230.75** -626.51 30228.63
(2.92) (1.96) (-0.36) (0.81)
Soc iodemograph ics
Fraction Holding 388.66 245.98 -286.60 -7732.49
High School DIPL. (1.13) (0.74) (-0.52) (-0.71)
Fraction white -166.69 -320.59 327.62 7311.37
(-0.54) (-1.00) (0.75) (0.88)
Fraction Reporting
Jointly 137.66 -222.45 1018.10 -1513.95
(0.37) (-0.36) (0.75) (-0.05)
Fraction Female -223.15 -371.96 1458.24 2176.54
Householder (-0.41) (-0.40) (0.70) (0.05)
Average Age 9.84 -3.38 35.27** -340.27
(1.57) (-0.28) (1.96) (-1.27)Table 2 -continued
Variable It-ID Nil-ID MU Iii
Fraction Foreign Born -379.43 -530.12 791.84 44790.31
(-0.49) (-0.58) (0.61) (l.85)
Constant 568.79 -5538.97 -18663.83 -26829.09
(0.23) (-0.60)(-1.31) (-0.10)
F-Value 491.80 747.34 975.91 1549.02
AdiR-Square 0.70 0.80 0.87 0.88
N 2923 2557 2022 2858
35